University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy
Volume 15

Issue 1

Article 8

2003

Procedural Due Process: Creating a Presumption of Heightened
Protection
Douglas J. Elmore

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp

Recommended Citation
Elmore, Douglas J. (2003) "Procedural Due Process: Creating a Presumption of Heightened Protection,"
University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy: Vol. 15: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jlpp/vol15/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

CASE COMMENT
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS: CREATING A PRESUMPTION OF
HEIGHTENED PROTECTION*
Douglas 1. Elmore**
Petitioners' three children were removed from petitioners' custody and
placed in a foster home following incidents of abuse and neglect.' After
efforts to reunite petitioners' family were unsuccessful, 2 respondent filed
an action in New York's Family Court requesting termination of
petitioners' parental rights.3 During the fact-finding stage of the
termination proceeding, 4 the Family Court found permanent neglect,5 and

* Editor'sNote: This case comment received the Huber C. HurstA wardfor the outstanding
case comment for Spring 2003. See Symposium, Defending Childhood, 14 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 125 (2003) (analyzing children and family law issues).
** The author would like to dedicate this case comment to the memory of his grandfather,
Richard K. Elmore.
1. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 751 (1982). Petitioners were John Santosky II and
Annie Santosky of Ulster County, N.Y. Id. The instant case related to three of petitioners' five
children - Tina Santosky, John Santosky III, and Jed Santosky. Id. at 751, 781 n.10. Tina,
petitioners' oldest child, was removed from the petitioners' custody in November 1973 following
allegations of physical abuse. Id. at 781 n. 10. John, petitioners' second oldest child, was removed
the following summer due to signs of abuse and malnutrition. Id. Jed was removed from petitioners'
custody when only three days old. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 781 n. 10. Jed's removal was the result of
the petitioners' treatment of Tina and John. Id.
2. See id. at 782. The Department of Social Services developed a written plan designed to
reunite the family. Id. The plan provided parental training, counseling at a family planning clinic,
psychiatric treatment, vocational training for John Santosky II, and family services counseling for
Annie Santosky. Id. Between 1976 and 1979, the state spent more than $15,000 on these and other
efforts to rehabilitate petitioners. Id.
3. Id.at 782-83. The Department of Social Services initially filed a termination petition in
1976. Id. at 782. This petition was dismissed on the grounds that there was still hope of further
improvement. Id. The instant case concerns the Department's second termination petition, filed in
October 1978. Id. The Family Court granted this second petition on the grounds that, among other
things, petitioners had failed to take advantage of the social and rehabilitative services, had
superficial, infrequent visits with their children, and had failed to become financially self-sufficient.
Santosky, 455 U.S. at 783.
4. See id. at 748. Under New York's statutory and regulatory scheme, state officials may
initiate a temporary removal of a child if the child is "neglected." Id. (citingN.Y. Fam. Ct. Act §§
1012(f), 1021-29 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82)). Upon removal, the child is placed in the
care of either a state institution or a foster home. Id.(citing N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b.7.(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82)). If the State is convinced that "positive, nurturing parent-child
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rejected petitioners' constitutional challenge to New York's application of
the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.6 At the ensuing
"dispositional hearing,"7 the Family Court terminated petitioners' parental
rights on the basis that termination was in the children's best interests.! On
appeal, the New York Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof was constitutional
because it balanced the natural parents' rights with those of the children. 9
The New York Court of Appeals dismissed petitioners' subsequent appeal
on the ground that a substantial constitutional question was not directly
involved.'" The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated and
remanded the appellate court decision, and HELD, that in termination of
parental rights proceedings, the clear and convincing evidence standard of
proof is the minimum adequate standard comporting with the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from depriving any
person of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."' 2 The
relationships no longer exist," it may initiate atermination proceeding in Family Court. Id. (citing
N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b.l.(b) (McKinney Supp. 1981-82)). New York's termination
proceeding, or "permanent neglect" proceeding, is split into a fact-finding hearing and a
dispositional hearing. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 748 (citingN.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 622, 623 (McKinney
1975 and Supp. 1981-82)). At the fact-finding stage, the state must prove that the child was
"permanently neglected" by a "fair preponderance of the evidence." Id.(citingN.Y. Fain. Ct. Act
§§ 614.1 (a)-(d), 622 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82) and N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 384-b.7.(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1981-82)). If the Court finds permanent neglect, the proceeding enters the
dispositional phase where the judge attempts to determine what course of action is in "the best
interests of the child." Id.at 748-49 (citing N.Y. Famn. Ct. Act §§ 611, 622, 63 1(c), and 634
(McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82)). The judge has three options at the dispositional phase:
dismiss the petition for termination, suspend the judgment to give the family another chance to
reunite, or terminate the parents' rights to the custody and care of the child. Id.(citing N.Y. Fam.
Ct. Act §§ 631-634 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82)).
5. Id.at 751-52. A finding of permanent neglect requires the State to have made "diligent
efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship." Id. at 748-49 (citingN.Y. Fain. Ct.
Act §§ 611, 614.1(d) (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82)). In addition, permanent neglect
requires the State to prove that the natural parents neglected "substantially and continuously or
repeatedly to maintain contact with or plan for the future of the child although physically and
financially able to do so." Id. at 748 (citingN.Y. Fain. Ct. Act §§ 611,614.1 (d), 622, 63 1(c), 634
(McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1981-82)).
6. Id.at751.
7. Id.at 752; see also supra text accompanying note 4.
8. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 752.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See id.at 769-70.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.The full text provides:

CASE COMA4ENT

Court has historically recognized that the Due Process Clause not only
protects one's fundamental rights from being limited, 3 but also guarantees
a fundamentally fair level of process.' 4 Determining at what level of
process a fundamental right is due, however, has been problematic for the
Court. 5
In Smith v. Organizationof Foster Families,the Court answered the
question of what process is due by applying a three-pronged balancing test
set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.6 The Eldridge test balances three factors
in establishing the fundamentally fair level of process: the private interests
affected by the proceeding, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a
fundamental right (or risk of error), and the countervailing state interests
in the use of the challenged procedure. 7
In Smith, petitioners challenged a district court ruling that foster parents
have an unconditional right to a hearing prior to the removal of their foster
child.18 The specific issue before the Court was whether New York's
removal procedures, which did not provide for an automatic hearing,
violated respondents' due process rights. 9 The Court reversed, holding
that the existing procedures were constitutionally adequate in light of the
three Eldridge factors.2" To arrive at this conclusion, the Court weighed
the three private interests involved, identified several procedures that
minimized the risk of error, and discussed the potential burdens a different
procedure would place on the state.2 ' Overall, the Court's analysis of the

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,
are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Id.
13. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 770 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
14. See id. at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431
U.S. 816, 842 (1977).
15. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (5-4 decision) (Blackmun, J. and
Stevens, J., dissenting). Lassiter'sthree concurring opinions and two dissenting opinions illustrate
the Court's differing views regarding a proper procedural due process analysis. Id.
16. Smith, 431 U.S. at 848-49 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
17. Id.
18. Id. at822.
19. Id. at 838-39. In Smith, respondents challenged the adequacy of the procedures on four
different grounds. Id. at 850-55.
20. Id. at 849-55.
21. Smith, 431 U.S at 850-55. The Court discussed the interests of the foster parents, the
child, and the natural parents. Id. at 850. The latter two were not parties to the action. Id. Under its
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three Eldridge factors was broad and inclusive, consistent with the notion
of a balancing test.
The Court revisited the issue of whether a state's parental termination
procedures were constitutional in Lassiter v. Department of Social
Services.22 Petitioner argued that North Carolina's termination procedures
violated the Due Process Clause by denying indigent parents an absolute
right to counsel. 23 The Court applied the Eldridge test, and held that
natural parents are not entitled to appointed counsel in every termination
proceeding. 24 A key aspect of the Court's reasoning was the presumption
that individuals have a right to appointed counsel only if their physical
liberty is in jeopardy.25 The Court explained that the net weight of the
Eldridge factors was not sufficient to overcome this presumption. 26 As it
did in Smith, the Court in Lassiter seemed to preserve the comprehensive
nature of the Eldridge balancing test.27
In the instant case, the Court again employed the Eldridge test to
decide whether a given procedure comported with due process.2 ' The
instant Court held that the minimum adequate standard of proof in a
parental rights termination proceeding was the clear and convincing
evidence standard. 29 First, the instant Court found that the balance of
private interests favored a stricter standard ofproof than the preponderance
of evidence standard.3" The instant Court reasoned that petitioners'
fundamental interest in the care, custody, and management of their
children was the most significant right implicated at the fact-finding

countervailing state interests analysis, the Court identified the potential fiscal and administrative
burdens arising under an automatic hearing. Id. at 851.
22. 452 U.S. 18, 24, 31(1981).
23. See id. at 24. Petitioner was served with notice of the hearing to terminate her parental
rights while in prison for a murder conviction. Id. at 21. Petitioner failed to bring counsel to the
termination hearing although she had counsel to appeal her murder conviction. Id. at 21-22.
24. Id. at 31.
25. See id. at 26, 31-32. The Court hypothesized that this presumption would be overcome
when the private interests were at their strongest, the risk of error was at its peak, and the State's
countervailing interests were at their lowest. Id. at 31-32.
26. See id.
27. Although the Court mentioned only one of the private interests concerned with the
outcome (right to companionship, care, custody, and management of their children), it presumably
did not intend to limit the scope of the test. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. The Court most likely gave
the Eldridge factors less attention than they did in Smith because of the presumption against an
absolute right to counsel. The Court probably withheld further elaboration because Lassiter's
circumstances were not similar to those the Court suggested would surmount this presumption.
28. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).
29. Id. at 769-70.
30. Id. at 758-59.
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stage. 3 The instant Court described this fundamental right as "far more
precious"" than any property interest, and observed that the preservation
of this right was even more compelling in this context.33
Though the instant Court recognized that the natural parents, their
children, and the foster parents could have divergent interests at the factfinding stage, it de-emphasized the importance of these divergent
interests.34 The instant Court noted that this stage pitted the natural parents
directly against the State, and therefore the focus was "emphatically" on
the petitioners' parental rights.35 The instant Court also justified
prioritizing petitioners' rights by claiming that other divergent interests
would be considered at the dispositional phase of the termination
proceeding.36
Next, the instant Court reasoned that the fact-finding stage's risk of
error was great enough to warrant increased procedural protection.37 The
instant Court discussed a variety of factors that amplified the risk of an
incorrect finding at this stage.3" To the instant Court, the judge's role as the
sole fact-finder,39 and the State's vast array of resources, 40 contributed
most to the danger of an erroneous deprivation. 4' The instant Court also
emphasized that a heightened standard of proof would have practical and
symbolic advantages. 42 Absent from the instant Court's analysis was
consideration of factors that potentially mitigate the risk of error.43

31. Id.
32. Id.at 758.
33. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
34. See id.
at 760-61.
35. Id. at 759.
36. Id. at 760-61. The instant Court explained that the divergent interests of both the children
and the foster parents would be taken into account at the dispositional hearing. Id.
37. See id.
at 763-65.
38. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63; see infra text accompanying note 39.
39. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63. The instant Court noted that because the judge was the sole
finder of fact, the fact-finding stage was vulnerable to the judge's statutory right to undervalue or
dismiss evidence deemed unreliable. See id. at 763 n. 12. The instant Court also expressed concern
over the possibility that factual determinations would be colored by economic or cultural bias. Id.
at 763.
40. Id. at 763-64. The resource that most disturbed the instant Court was the State's ability
to construct evidence. See id. at 763.
41. Id. at 762-63. The instant Court observed that the following factors increase the risk of
error in New York's termination proceeding: the imprecise standards of law, the types of evidence
involved, the poor, uneducated status of most litigants, and the lack of a"double jeopardy" defense.
Id.
42. Id.at 764.
43. See id. at 762-65; but see Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 849-52 (1977).
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After describing the State's countervailing interests, the instant Court
found that they too were consistent with a higher standard of proof.44 The
instant Court identified two parens patriae interests that the State had in
the termination proceeding. The instant Court remarked that the State's
parens patriae interest in providing the child with a permanent home
deserved increased procedural protection because that was the State's
principal objective at the fact-finding stage.45 The instant Court implied
that the State's parens patriae interest in terminating parental rights should
not receive increased protection because the interest does not arise until
the dispositional phase of the proceeding.46
The Eldridge factors led the instant Court to conclude that the
preponderance of the evidence standard violated petitioners' due process
rights.47 Based on this conclusion, the Court determined that the
appropriate standard of proof in termination proceedings was the clear and
convincing evidence standard.48 The instant Court chose this standard of
proof because it was hesitant to apply the reasonable doubt standard in a
civil context.49
In an ardent dissent, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
Justice White, and Justice O'Connor, portrayed the instant Court's
application of the Eldridge test as "myopic."5 The dissent opposed the
majority's methodology, maintaining that its evaluation of the termination
proceeding lacked the flexibility typical of a due process analysis. 5 ' The
dissent also opposed the outcome of the Eldridgetest.52 The dissent argued

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
Id.
Id.at 767.
Id.at 768.
Id.at 769.
See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 768-69.
Id. at 771 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See id.at 774-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id.at 771-72 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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that the instant holding "conflicted with federalist principles"53 because it
threatened states' traditional authority in the realm of family law. 4
While the instant Court's statement of the Eldridge test was facially
identical to previous aiticulations 5 its application of the test was a
dramatic departure from precedent. First, the instant Court significantly
narrowed the scope of relevant private interests. 6 By repeatedly
emphasizing that the petitioners and the State were the focus of the factfinding stage," the instant Court implicitly defined the relevant private
interests as the interests of the parties to the proceeding in question. In
contrast, the Court in Smith considered a pair of non-party interests in
determining the procedural adequacy of a foster home transfer hearing. 8
The Court's view of the relevant private interests in the instant case
likely disposed of some interests that should have a role in the Court's due
process analysis. The instant Court first set aside the children's interest in
avoiding an erroneous continuation of petitioners' parental rights. 9 In
similar fashion, the instant Court dismissed the foster parents'
"substantial" interest in establishing legal custody.6" Because of this
restrictive definition, the instant Court's private interests prong is biased
toward increased due process protection.
The instant Court also changed the substance of the risk of error prong
of the Eldridgetest. By disregarding New York's procedural safeguards, 6
the instant Court implied that the risk of error is the probability of an
erroneous factual determination, unmitigated by factors that could

53. Id. at 772 n.2 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). The dissent maintained that the instant holding
conflicted with federalist principles for two reasons. See id. at 771-72 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
First, the dissent believed that the instant Court threatened states' traditional autonomy in the sphere
of domestic law. Id.(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Second, the dissent argued that "this Court simply
has no role in establishing the standards of proof that States must follow" in judicial proceedings
they provide to their citizens. Id. at 772 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In support of this latter
contention, the dissent argued that the instant Court's holding was "wholly unsupported" by
precedent. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 772 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
54. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 771 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The dissent observed that in the past
the Court has "scrupulously refrained from interfering with state answers to domestic relations
questions." Id. The dissent added that because of this policy, states have been free to experiment
and have developed novel approaches to domestic problems. Id.
55. Compare id. at 754, with Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 848-49 (1977).
56. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758-61.
57. Id. at 759-61.
58. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 846-47.
59. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61.
60. Id.at 761.
61. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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decrease this probability.62 This definition is a striking departure from that
employed in Lassiter.In Lassiter,the Court acknowledged the probability
of an erroneous deprivation of a fundamental right, but recognized the
importance of a number of procedural protections that tempered this risk.63
The instant Court's version of the risk of error artificially inflates the
threat of a faulty factual determination. This inflated threat results from the
analytical exclusion of procedural safeguards that are components of the
true risk of error.64 Since the instant Court's conception of the risk of error
will exceed the true risk of error,65 the possibility that this Eldridge factor
will encourage heightened procedural protection is inevitable.
The instant Court, thus, fundamentally changed the nature of the
Eldridgetest. By eliminating factors that might influence the outcome of
the test, the instant Court skewed the balance in favor of increased
procedural protection." In essence, the instant Court created a modified
Eldridgetest featuring a rebuttable presumption of heightened procedural
due process protection.67
The instant Court's modification ofthe Eldridgetest spawned a variety
of undesirable results. For example, the modified Eldridge test departed
from the due process concept of fundamental fairness. 68 The private
interests prong of the test likely excludes some interests that should be
evaluated in deciding the fairness of a procedural scheme. In addition, the
risk of error prong ignores some procedural safeguards, undermining the
flexibility typically stressed in due process analyses. 69 The Eldridge

62. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 612-14.
63. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 450-51 (1981).
64. See supra text accompanying note 43.
65. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-65. Due to the instant Court's exclusion of factors that
could mitigate the risk of error, the instant Court's conception of the risk of error will always
exceed the true risk of error. Id. The instant Court's definition of risk of error will only equal the
true risk of error when then the proceeding in question lacks any discernible factor that could
reduce the possibility of an erroneous factual determination. Because of the numerous procedures
involved in any given proceeding, the likelihood that a proceeding would lack any factors
mitigating the risk of error seems small. Under its definition, the instant Court's risk of error will
never be less than the true risk of error.
66. See id at 758-68.
67. See id. Through its definition of the relevant private interests and its conception of the
risk of error, the instant Court tipped the Eldridge balancing test in favor of increased procedural
protection before any factors are put on the scale. See id. In substance, a balancing test that
inherently favors one outcome is a test with a rebuttable presumption favoring that outcome.
68. See id. at 774-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 343 (1976), maintained that the only way the Court can determine whether a challenged
governmental action is fundamentally fair is through a broad due process inquiry. Id. at 775.
69. Id. at 774-75.
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balancing test is more consistent with the idea of fundamental fairness
because it takes into account a broader set of facts and circumstances.
The instant Court's modified Eldridgetest also creates tension in the
federal balance of power. Since it adopted a role traditionally reserved to
the states, the instant Court expanded its powers ofjudicial review.7" This
action necessarily improved the judiciary's power relative to the other
federal branches. The extent of this improvement may have been slight,
but the instant Court nonetheless threatened the delicate federal balance of
power.
Likewise, the instant Court disrupted the relationship between New
York's three branches of government. The result of the modified Eldridge
test detracted from the New York Legislature's power to establish
standards of proof in state proceedings." At the same time, the instant
Court diminished the federal judiciary branch's power ofjudicial review.72
These reductions in power seem far from cataclysmic, but they
undoubtedly affected the balance of power in New York.
Furthermore, the modified Eldridgetest is difficult to rationally limit.
Restricting its application to cases involving petitioners' fundamental
rights may create a slippery slope problem. Courts may struggle in
confining the application of the test to specific fundamental rights. In this
event, the modified test might confer heightened procedural protection on
an array of liberty interests, overburdening legislatures with statutes
needing revision.
Similarly, limiting the application of the modified Eldridge test to
family law disputes is not a practical solution. This limitation could result
in increased due process protection for all fundamental rights arising in
this context. A limitation of this nature would conflict with the notion that
some Fourteenth Amendment rights are more valued than others.73
Finally, narrowing the application of the modified Eldridge test to
standards of proof might interfere with various legislative determinations.
The problem with this restriction lies in the test's presumption of increased
procedural protection. If the modified test were applied to statutory
70. See id. at 772 n.2 (Rehquist, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the instant Court's
reliance on Woodbyv. INS, 385 U.S. 276,284 (1966), for the proposition that the standard of proof
is the kind of question traditionally left to the judiciary to resolve. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 772
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the Court in Woodby sought to determine the
proper standard of proof under a federal statute, not a state statute. Id.
71. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 771-73.
72. See id. The instant Court's ruling on the adequacy of the standard of proof applied in a
state proceeding logically diminishes the federal judicial branch's role as the final arbiter of state
procedural due process matters.
73. See id. at 758-59.
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standards of proof, its presumption could work as a bar against these
legislative enactments.74 Thus, in light ofthese problems, the most realistic
way to limit the modified Eldridge test is to confine its application to the
discrete facts and circumstances of the instant case.
The instant facts revealed the Court's struggle to define procedural due
process rights.7 Its efforts to protect one fundamental right created a test
that favors heightened protection for numerous liberty interests. While this
judicial multi-tasking might have caught the attention of state
legislatures,76 it also disrupted the federal balance of power, encroached
upon states' rights, and retreated from the longstanding notion of
fundamental fairness. Since the modified test yielded these unsavory
results and is difficult to practically limit, the Court should have narrowly
confined its application to the instant facts. Although the Eldridge
balancing test might not always produce a desirable outcome, the instant
Court should recognize that this test is a lesser evil in future procedural
due process disputes.

74. The instant case is an excellent example ofthis scenario. The modified test's presumption
favoring increased protection became, in essence, a presumption against New York's legislative
determination that the preponderance of the evidence standard was appropriate in termination
proceedings.
75. See also Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
76. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 749. An underlying motive of the instant Court may have been
to prod the New York legislature to conform to recent legislative trends. Id. As the Court noted,
thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands had enacted more stringent
standards of proof in termination proceedings before the instant case was decided. Id.

